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Abstract
This paper investigates whether or not the natural selection mechanism (NSM) of eco-
nomic Darwinism works in severe recessions. Although standard ﬁrm models imply the
importance of NSM in an economy by showing ﬁrm’s rational behavior on entry, surviv-
ing, and exit leads to macro-level TFP growth, there is almost no evidence to demonstrate
NSM works even in severe recessions and depressions. Based on micro data of the Basic
Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA) by Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry, we construct a comprehensive ﬁrm-level panel dataset for Japan from
1994 to 1998, especially designed for the analysis of a ﬁrm’s entry, survival, and exit and
its relationship with TFP. Empirical results show that efﬁcient ﬁrms in terms of TFP quit
while inefﬁcient ones survived in the banking-crisis period of 1996-1997. Besides, this
phenomenon is mainly observed for new entrants and contributes substantially to a fall
in macro TFP after 1996. These facts strongly suggest malfunctioning of NSM in severe
recessions.
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11 Introduction
Economic Darwinism explains the survival of the ﬁttest ﬁrms in relation to the change in the
business environment. According to the laissez-faire principle, the competitive market guar-
antees that the natural selection mechanism (NSM) of Darwinism leads to efﬁcient resource
allocation, because ﬁrms with low proﬁtability are forced to quit and productive ones can sur-
vive in the market. As Galor and Moav (2002) explain, the struggle to survive can even trigger
revolutions which break blockades and open the way to long term economic growth.
The microeconomic foundation of NSM has been established by the development of so-
phisticated ﬁrm models since Jovanovic (1982). The standard model depicts a ﬁrm’s decision
for entry, surviving, and exiting as a result of maximization of the expected discounted future
net cash ﬂows. Olley and Pakes (1996), demonstrated that ﬁrms’ private decisions in the U.S.
telecommunications industry eventually contributed to productivity progress for the industry as
a whole.
Several cases of empirical evidence of a ﬁrm’s entry/exit have suggested the fulﬁllment of
NSM both in developing and advanced economies. It is, however, still not certain whether
NSM really works well in severe recessions, because we have rarely experienced a serious
economic downturn such as the Great Depression early in the twentieth century, where the
market mechanisms might fail to function.
To answer thequestionofwhetherNSMreallyworkswellina severe recession, theJapanese
economy in the 1990s appears to be a prime example for analysis. The plight of the recent
Japanese economy has stirred heated discussion on its causes and remedies. As recession
showed its stubbornness despite massive ﬁscal and monetary stimulation, economists turned
their attention toward the supply side of the Japanese economy, especially a large decline in
Total Factor Productivity (TFP).1 Since malfunction of the NSM on a ﬁrm’s entry, surviving,
and exit could explain the decline in macro level TFP, it might be meaningful to investigate how
1Carefully purging out other factors, Fukao, Inui, Kawai and Miyagawa (2002) found that the rate of Japan’s
macro TFP growthin 1990s was only 40%of that in 1980s. Nakajima, Kasuya, Saida and Tanemura (2002), based
on a dual approach of TFP, revealed that productivity slowdown had already started before the burst of the bubble
economy. Nishimura and Shirai (2003) observed serious retardation in technical progress of the Japanese service
(includes wholesale & retail trade, transport, and telecommunications) sectors in 1990s. Hayashi and Prescott
(2002) utilized a dynamic macro model to show the simulated business cycle caused by productivity slowdown
follows the actual GDP ﬂuctuations in Japan.
2NSM has functioned in this severe recession period of the Japanese economy.2
A dataset at the ﬁrm-level for a panel of companies is essential to accomplish this inves-
tigation. Most countries unfortunately conduct comprehensive surveys only of establishments
in manufacturing, such as the census of manufactures.3 In contrast, the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry of Japan launched The Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and
Activities (BSJBSA), which covers all commercial ﬁrms with 50 employees or more and cap-
italization of over 30 million yen, who are at least partly engaged in mining, manufacturing,
wholesale & retail sales, and restaurant activities. Thus, this data set gives us a unique oppor-
tunity to examine whether NSM works in severe recessions in a wide range of industries in a
developed economy.
The results are striking. In Japan, efﬁcient ﬁrms in terms of TFP went out of business while
inefﬁcient ones have survived since 1996. NSM, which is supposedly inherent in a market
economy, showed malfunctions. Besides, this phenomenon was mainly observed with new
entrants and can explain a considerable part of the fall in macro TFP after 1996. The year 1996
is key to the interpretation of the results, because the vulnerability of the Japanese ﬁnancial
market started to become obvious in 1996 and 1997. Our results might be consistent with the
fact that Japanese banks, suffering from non-performing loan problems after the burst of the
bubble, ﬁnally fell into functional disorder early in 1997.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief survey
of preceding entry/exit studies on both theoretical and empirical sides. Section 3 explores a
ﬁrm’s entry/exit behavior patterns. In Section 4 we show basic TFP calculation results and
analyze the relationship between a ﬁrm’s entry/exit and the industry level TFP. The ﬁnal section
concludes the paper. Detailed descriptions of data sources and calculation methodology of TFP
2Several empirical works go further than estimating macro- or industry level TFP and investigate the effects of
sectoral and regional adjustment on TFP growth. Kuroda and Nomura (1999) and Fukao et al. (2002) calculated a
resource reallocation effect among industries on macro TFP and showed itslarge slowdownin the 1990s. Higuchi,
Nakajima, Nakahigashi and Hino (2003) pointed out that the rigidity of an industrial structure in prefectures pre-
vented macro TFP progress in Japan. Bae (2002) decomposed the macro TFP growth of Japan from 1960 to 1999
into a technical progress factor and an efﬁciency improvement factor and derived a result showing that the latter
one has rarely been found. The results of these studies suggest a problem in the adjustment process in Japan.
3In the U.S., for instance, because there is no survey of the “real” ﬁrm level, ﬁrm-level data is constructed by
summing up inputs and outputs of establishments that belong to the same ﬁrm. This type of ﬁrm-level data can
be called quasi ﬁrm-level data, because it could cause a lack of important information about ﬁrms’ sales activities,
R&D, and personnel management.
3are provided in Appendix A and B respectively.
2 Theoretical background and empirical experiences
Entry and exit behavior is one of several choices a ﬁrm must make. Standard models of a ﬁrm’s
turnover under a competitive market situation, as depicted in Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn
(1993), and Ericson and Pakes (1995), suggest that a ﬁrm enters (leaves) when entry (exit) is
expected tocontributetothe projecteddiscounted future net cash ﬂows. Calibrationstudies have
played an essential role in support of this theory. Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) applied an
industrydynamics model tothe U.S. automobiletireindustry and showed thatthe model tracked
actual movement of the number of ﬁrms very well. Pakes and Ericson (1998), using ﬁrm-level
micro data of manufacturing and retail industries, showed the appropriateness of ﬁrm level
dynamics models. Campbell (1998) focused on the relationship between business ﬂuctuations
caused by productivity shocks and a ﬁrm’s entry/exit patterns, and showed calibrated numbers
relative to the model “mimicking” the real U.S. economy.
Empirical analysis based on ﬁrm models is necessary for investigating whether NSM is
working properly. The complexity of a rich theoretical model, however, makes it difﬁcult to ac-
complish a direct statistical test of structural equations. Thus, empirical studies try to examine
the feasibility of a ﬁrm model by testing the consistency between the model’s implication and
reality with entry/exit behavior. The model of Hopenhayn (1993), for instance, suggests that
exiting ﬁrms have lower productivity than surviving ﬁrms and productivity distribution will be
stochastically increasing in the age of the cohort. If a panel dataset that depicts ﬁrms’ entry, sur-
viving, and exit behavior is available, we can calculate productivity measures and test whether
they really conform to the theory.
There are at least three necessary conditions that need to be met to make an empirical test
on this issue truly useful. Firstly, datasets should be constructed completely at the ﬁrm level. A
ﬁrm’s entry and exit points are crucially important managerial decisions made by a ﬁrm itself.
Besides, we must take account of increases of relative signiﬁcance in non-production activities
such as sales, R&D, and personnel affairs in manufacturing ﬁrms.4 You must look at all of the
4According to Nakajima, Maeta and Kiyota (2000), a cost share of a non-production activities for major 54
electric machinery manufacturing ﬁrms was 35% on average in 1996. It is approximately 5 % point increase from
1985.
4individual aspects of the ﬁrm when trying to reﬂect the ﬁrm as a whole. Only summing up the
various elements of a ﬁrm does not sufﬁciently represent the ﬁrm for this study. Secondly, ser-
vice sectors should also be included. The growing signiﬁcance of non-manufacturing sectors is
a general trend observed in most advanced economies. Finally, productivity should be measured
in a general form. Labor productivity has the greatest popularity because of its easy calculation
and interpretation, but that could be a biased indicator when a resource substitution effect exists.
TFP, which is deﬁned as the ratio of output to all input (or input index), has superiority over
labor productivity because of its generality.
Viewing preceding empirical studies on a ﬁrm’s entry, surviving, and exit issues, there are
almost none to satisfy all of the above three conditions.5 The critical lack of ﬁrm level surveys
is inherent to all of the studies.6 Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) and Haltiwanger (1997)
utilized the Longitudinal Research Database and found plant-level entry/exit patterns had sig-
niﬁcant effects on the overall TFP growth of the U.S. manufacturing industry. Griliches and
Regev (1995), focusing on the Israeli manufacturing industry (including mining), found the ef-
fects of ﬁrm turnover on industry-level labor productivity were quite small. Olley and Pakes
(1996) utilized a ﬁrm dynamics model and conﬁrmed that since the market liberalization in the
1980 of the telecommunications industry a plant’s opening & shutdown dynamics made consid-
erable contributions to the TFP progress in this industry. Aw, Chen and Roberts (2001), using
the Taiwanese Census of Manufactures, showed that a ﬁrm’s turnover made a considerable con-
tribution to industry level TFP growth in Taiwan. Hahn (2000), based on establishment-level
panel data for Korean manufacturing sector, derived the same conclusion as Aw et al. (2001).7
This paper is the ﬁrst empirical analysis on this issue completely on a ﬁrm level, extending
5The only one example we are acquainted with is Bellone, Musso and Qu´ er´ e (2003) targeting French manu-
facturing industry based on purely ﬁrm level panel data. They showed positive contribution of ﬁrm’s turnover to
industry level TFP growth.
6Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) compiled a panel dataset for the U.S. manufacturing industries by
gathering the data of establishments within the same ﬁrm. For the Canadian manufacturing sector, Baldwin and
Gorecki (1991) constructed a database with corresponding establishment information and identiﬁed various ways
of entry and exit: plant birth, acquisition, or plant switch for entry and plant closing, divestiture, or plant switch
for exit through the detailed cohort analysis. These two datasets are on a quasi-ﬁrm level, that is, aggregation of
establishments.
7There are some empirical studies focusing on developing countries. Liu (1993) and Liu and Tybout (1996)
measured plant level TFP and made a comparison between entry, surviving, and exiting plants for the Chilean and
Colombian economies. The same analysis for Morocco was done by Tybout (1992). All of them concluded that a
ﬁrm’s turnover has a signiﬁcant effect on macro level productivity growth.
5the industry coverage to wholesale & retail trade and others, and based on TFP as an efﬁciency
criterion. Furthermore, we focus only on “active ﬁrms” in BSJBSA to remove an upward bias
of entry and exit caused by “dormant ﬁrms”.8 One common result among the preceding em-
pirical works was that there were no negative contributions of a ﬁrm’s turnover to macro TFP
growth, which is strong evidence to support the effectiveness of NSM. This paper will answer
the question whether the same result is obtained in the case of Japan during a serious recession.
3 Data
3.1 Data source
The main data source for the overall analysis in this paper is the micro data of The Basic Survey
of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (BSJBSA) by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry from 1994 to 1998. BSJBSA covers all the enterprises with 50 employees or more and
greater than a 30 million yen capitalization and engaged in mining, manufacturing, wholesale
& retail, or restaurant activities.9 The Survey also covers ﬁrms in agriculture, construction, and
various service industries, so long as they also engage at least partly in one of mining, manufac-
turing, wholesale and retail trade, or restaurant activities.10 The ﬁrst and second investigation
years are 1991 and 1994 respectively. Only since 1994 has BSJBSA data been available for
every year. There are four special features in BSJBSA.
Firstly, it is a survey of ﬁrms. Although rich micro data sources are now available in many
countries like the U.S. and Canada, most of them are not based on surveys of ﬁrms but of
establishments. Certainly establishment data sources are useful for the estimation of produc-
tion or cost functions from the viewpoint of production technologies. A resource allocation
within a ﬁrm, however, is determined as a result of managerial decisions. Information about
establishments only, such as R&D, M&A, and re-organization, is hardly enough to handle the
issues related to managerial strategies of a ﬁrm as a whole. In this sense BSJBSA provides quite
8Dunne et al. (1988) excluded the smallest ﬁrms from the sample for the same purpose.
9See Table 1 for industries that BSJBSA covers. The industry classiﬁcation in the table is based on the System
of National Accounts deﬁnition.
10The organization of Japanese ministries is vertically divided according to the industries of which they should
take charge. METI is mainly in charge of manufacturing, electricity, and wholesale & retail trade industries and
responsible for gathering their statistics.
6Table 1: SNA industry classiﬁcations
1 agriculture 13 transportation machinery
2 mining 14 precision machinery
3 foods 15 miscellaneous machinery
4 textile 16 construction
5 pulp & paper 17 electricity, gas & water
6 chemical 18 wholesale
7 petroleum & coal 19 retail
8 stone & clay 20 ﬁnance
9 primary metal 21 real estate
10 metal products 22 transportation & communications
11 general machinery 23 service
12 electric machinery
valuable information to accomplish empirical studies on ﬁrm theory.
Secondly, code numbers are attached to all the samples for the identiﬁcation in BSJBSA.
Since the code is speciﬁc to each ﬁrm, we can easily trace it in time series and make a panel
data set.
Thirdly, the data source covers a wide range of ﬁrm size. Although the utilization of the
ﬁnancial statements is another option to capture a ﬁrm’s behavior, their availability is limited
only to a company whose stock is listed on the stock exchange. BSJBSA does not have such a
limitation; it is limited only in that it surveys ﬁrms with 50 employees or more and a capitaliza-
tion in excess of 30 million yen.11
Finally, BSJBSA basically covers only “active ﬁrms” in the sense that they are truly engaged
in regular business activities, because it imposes a lower limit on the ﬁrm size of 50 employees
or more and 30 million yen in capital. Inclusion of “dormant ﬁrms,” which exist just for pur-
poses other than regular business, would lead to seriously biased results on a ﬁrm’s entry and
exit.
11However, a serious weakness exists in BSJBSA related to the analysis in this paper and that is a lack of
information concerning a ﬁrm’s duration. Suppose ﬁrms A and B were merged. There are three possibilities:
(1) ﬁrm B was merged into A, (2) ﬁrm A was merged into B, and (3) they were merged to form a new ﬁrm,
C. BSJBSA provides no information to identify which one actually occurred. It is certainly worth distinguishing
the organizational expansion by self-reproduction from that by M&A. In case of (3) ﬁrm C should be obviously
differentiated from a purely new ﬁrm.
73.2 Sample selection
BSJBSA has some samples with abnormally large or small values in answers to its question-
naires. However, it is difﬁcult to identify which one is a “real” error, because it could be a
true value containing worthy information. In this paper we exclude samples that have logically
inconsistent values from the data set. A sample is regarded inconsistent if it ﬁts one of the fol-
lowing three cases: (1) at least one of the values of regular workers, investment, capital, debt,
identiﬁcation code, and industry code is missing, (2) at least one of the values of ﬁrm age (the
year of establishment minus the year of investigation), labor compensation, tangible ﬁxed asset,
the number of main ofﬁces, and gross value added is missing or negative, and (3) the number of
regular workers (including part-time workers) is less than that of part-time workers.
3.3 Deﬁnitions of entry and exit
In BSJBSA, entry and exit are deﬁned as appearance in and disappearance from BSJBSA respec-
tively. Entry and exit under this deﬁnition do not necessarily correspond to origin and termi-
nation, respectively, because, as is mentioned above, samples in BSJBSA are censored. Also,
we have considerable numbers of re-entry ﬁrms that disappear once and re-appear. BSJBSA
provides no information to identify types of a ﬁrm’s entry/exit and re-entry behavior. 12
To solve the complexity, we present our own deﬁnitions of entry, exit, and surviving ﬁrms
in our data set as follows.
1. Appearance in BSJBSA with a new identiﬁcation code is deﬁned as entry.
2. Reappearance in BSJBSA with the same identiﬁcation code as before is also deﬁned as
entry.13
3. Either temporary or permanent disappearance from BSJBSA is deﬁned as exit.
4. Continuing ﬁrms are deﬁned as those which stay in BSJBSA for at least two consecutive
years.
12More detailed explanations about this issue are provided in Appendix A.
13One might regard this procedure too extreme. We have examined robustness of our results with respect to this
procedure and found qualitatively the same result was obtained when we adopted other procedures. See Appendix
A.
8The panel data set constructed based on the deﬁnitions above is deﬁnitely unbalanced. Here-
after, we call this data set the N2K (Nishimura-Nakajima-Kiyota) panel, which is utilized for
the empirical studies in the following sections.
4 Entry/exit behavior of Japanese ﬁrms
Previous studies about the entry and exit of Japanese ﬁrms have pointed out that there are rela-
tively few in the post World War II period, compared with pre-War periods and other countries.
For instance, Nishimura and Kawamoto (2003), utilizing Company Statistics (Ministry of Com-
merce and Industry) and Establishment and Enterprise Census (Ministry of Management and
Coordination), showed the exit rate of the Japanese ﬁrms was less than 1% after 1987 as com-
pared with 6-9% at the pre-war period. (See Table 2) This evidence seems to strongly support
the common conviction that ﬁrms’ entries and exits are relatively rare in Japan. This subsection
presents observations like Nishimura and Kawamoto based on Company Statistics and Estab-
lishment and Enterprise Census that could underestimate ﬁrms’ “economically meaningful”
entry and exit behavior.
In popular terminology, “exit” means a complete closure of business. However, according
to this deﬁnition, “dormant” ﬁrms with no signiﬁcant business but which are not closed are
classiﬁed as continuing ﬁrms. It is well known in Japan that there are a sizable number of
“dormant ﬁrms” existing simply for tax-shelter and/or other purposes, though it is very difﬁcult
to determine the number of such dormant ﬁrms.
In economic analysis of productivity, we are concerned not with dormant ﬁrms, but “active”
ﬁrms. In this respect, entry and exit numbers presented in the previous studies, based on Com-
pany Statistics and the like, are misleading since they contain many dormant ﬁrms. In contrast,
in BSJBSA, where ﬁrms with 50 employees or more and a capitalization in excess of 30 million
yen are investigated, these ﬁrms are likely to be “active.” Thus, the entry/exit behavior observed
in the N2K panel illustrates the dynamics of “active ﬁrms” as properly deﬁned.
Table 3 depicts how ﬁrms originated in a certain year have survived since then.14 While the
14Since there is a two-year blank in investigation between the ﬁrst investigation (in 1991) and the second in-
vestigation (in 1994), a sample identiﬁed as a closing ﬁrm in 1994 in BSJBSA would have already disappeared in
1992 or 1993. We calculated survival rates in 1994 for “before 1991 entry” cohort on an annual basis by dividing
original hazard rates by three.
9Table 2: Creation and destruction of Japanese enterprises
Source: Nishimura and Kawamoto (2003)
By Industry




1924-28 5.38% 2.70% 2.03% 1.17% 3.51% 6.49% 9.04%
1934-40 0.40% -6.55% -0.43% 16.62% 3.09% -1.88% 2.75%
Rate of Creation (Rate of New Enterprises)
1924-28 10.93% 6.30% 8.29% 5.34% 9.55% 11.98% 13.22%
1936-40 9.25% 5.09% 7.79% 19.93% 11.32% 7.76% 9.88%
Rate of Destruction (Estimated)
1924-28 6.65% 3.97% 6.70% 4.35% 6.80% 6.83% 5.69%
1936-40 8.97% 9.43% 8.10% 5.77% 9.09% 9.07% 7.81%
By Industry
year
1981-86 2.31% 3.17% 1.18% 1.97% 1.49% 1.23% 5.31% 3.08%
1987-91 3.25% 5.26% 2.09% 1.66% 1.30% 4.53% 6.04% 4.72%
1992-96 1.41% 3.92% -0.30% -1.20% 1.80% 1.21% 2.87% 1.42%
Rate of Creation (Estimated)
1981-86 3.52% 5.46% 2.25% 3.56% 2.25% 1.90% 6.10% 4.11%
1987-91 3.76% 5.98% 2.53% 2.48% 1.62% 4.80% 6.39% 5.28%
1992-96 2.12% 4.90% 0.44% -0.08% 2.16% 1.55% 3.40% 2.19%
Rate of Destruction (Bunkruptcy Rate)
1981-86 1.33% 2.58% 1.12% 1.72% 0.82% 0.70% 0.97% 1.16%
1987-91 0.57% 0.88% 0.48% 0.88% 0.33% 0.33% 0.44% 0.68%









Rate of Net Increase
Source: Shoko Sho (Ninistry of Commerce and Industry), Kaisha-Tokei (Company Statistics), 1929 (22-25, 258-261),
1930 (22-25, 260-263), and 1945 (22-25, 364-365).
Notes: The rate of net increase is the change in the number of existing companies at the end of the fiscal year.  The rate of
creation is the ratio of newly-establised companies to the existing companies.  The rate of destruction is estimated from the
rate of creation and the rate of net increase.  The rates are the average of annual rates.
Rate of Net Increase
Source: For, net increase and creation, Somu Cho (Management and Coordination Agency), Jigyosho Kigyo Tokei
(Establishement and Enterprise Census), 1981 (Vol. 3, Table 3), 1986 (Vol. 3, Part 1, Table 4), 1991 (Vol. 3, Table 4),
1996 (Vol. 3-1, Table 3).  For destruction, Chusho Kigyou Jigyoudan (Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Corporation),
Kigyou Tousan Chousa Nenpou (Annual Reprt of Bunkruptcy companies), 1990 (Table 14-1) and 1997 (Table 14-1).
Notes: The rate of net increase is change in the number of existing companies at the each survey date. The survey of
existing companies was undertaken as of July 1 in 1981, 1986, and 1991 and October 1 in 1996. The number of
destruction is calculated at the end of fiscal year. Destruction means disposition by suspension of bank credit, [legal]
bankruptcy, an application for composition, a ruling of reorganization and rehabilitation or a ruling of liquidation. For
destruction of enterprises with the total amount of the dept under ten million yen, 215 major cities are surveyed, while the
whole country is surveyed for destruction with the total amount of the dept no less than ten million yen.  Thus, the rate of
destruction is slightly underestimated since destruction in small cities may not be properly counted. The rate of creation is
estimated from the rate of destruction and the rate of net increase. The rates are the average of annual rates.
Pre-World War II Era










10Table 3: Entry and exit patterns in the N2K panel
Cohorts
Entry




1995 18,227 3,876 3,844
1996 16,970 3,361 3,054 2,433
1997 15,689 2,928 2,553 1,802 2,809
1998 14,610 2,607 2,233 1,507 2,178 2,670
Entry and Exit rate (%)
Entry 20.4 15.5 9.4 10.9 10.4
Exit 16.7 10.8 9.9 11.0 10.3
Unconditional survival rate (%)
1991 100.0
1994 94.1 100.0
1995 76.2 79.6 100.0
1996 71.0 69.0 79.4 100.0
1997 65.6 60.1 66.4 74.1 100.0
1998 61.1 53.5 58.1 61.9 77.5 100.0
Conditional survival rate (%)
1991 100.0
1994 83.3 100.0
1995 91.5 79.6 100.0
1996 93.1 86.7 79.4 100.0
1997 92.5 87.1 83.6 74.1 100.0
1998 93.1 89.0 87.5 83.6 77.5 100.0
Notes： 1) An unconditional survival rate stands for a ratio of the number of surving firms to that in the original entry year.
2) A conditional survival rate stands for a ratio of the number of surviving firms to that in the previous year.
Source: N2K Panel data
3) Values in 1994 are annual means. Values in 1991 show the number of firms born exactly in 1991 and before then.
11“unconditional” rate is a ratio of the number of surviving ﬁrms to the number of ﬁrms in their
entry year, “conditional” means a comparison with the previous year.
From the table, we obtain three outstanding ﬁndings. Firstly, survival rates just after entry
are quite low. More than 20% of new entrants exit from the pool of active ﬁrms within the
next year, and 30% exit within two years later. Secondly, entry/exit rates are very high unlike
Nishimura and Kawamoto (2003) ﬁndings. This result shows that Japanese ﬁrms of certain
employment levels and capital sizes have been more frequently taking actions of entry and
exit than observed in the previous studies. This result suggests that low entry/exit rates of
previous studies, including dormant ﬁrms, may be misleading with respect to entry and exit of
economically “active” ﬁrms.15 Finally, survival probabilities rise as time passes. For a ﬁrm to
live for a long time, it has to overcome difﬁculties in its infancy.
It should be emphasized here that the results in Table 3 are comparable with those for the
U.S. and Canada with some reservations.16 The entry rates of 10 to 20% in Table 3 are much
higher than the Canadian case (2 to 7%), but less than the U.S. case (30 to 50%). The same
relationship holds for the exit rates of the three countries, although Canada showed 10.1% exit
rate in 1981 (Table 2, p.308), which is very close to that of Japan. On the contrary, surviving
rates are primarily the same for the three economies. The ﬁve-year- (four-year in case of Japan)
surviving rate of the entry cohort is 40 to 60% for the U.S., 40% for Canada (1970 cohort), and
47% for Japan (1994 cohort).
5 Entry/exit and TFP
Resemblance and difference in entry/exit patterns alone are not enough to evaluate NSM of the
Japanese economy. In this section we examine whetherﬁrmswith relativelyhigherperformance
survive and those with lower performance exit. Among various measures of ﬁrm performance,
total factor productivity (TFP) is chosen in this paper. Although labor productivity has great
15A careful reader might point out that the N2K panel overestimates entry/exit frequencies because it treats re-
entry ﬁrms as new entrants. To conﬁrm whether this N2K data processing is inﬂuential or not, refer to Table A1 in
Appendix based on the original BSJBSA data set. According to the row 52 to 58, there exist 382 ﬁrms that appear
in 1994, disappear in 1995, and reappear after 1996. Even if these ﬁrms are taken into account in Table 3, more
than 10% of ﬁrms originating in 1994 closed within one year.
16Dunne et al. (1988) covers all plants and their subsidiary ﬁrms except the smallest ﬁrms (e.g. one employee
ﬁrms) in the U.S. manufacturing industry. Baldwin and Gorecki (1991) also constructed dataset on manufacturing
plants and ﬁrms in Canada. Covering periods are 1963 to 1982 for the U.S., 1970 to 82 for Canada.
12popularity because of its easy handling, TFP is preferable from the viewpoint of comprehen-
siveness. In particular, we analyze the issue in two respects. Firstly, we examine whether less
productive ﬁrms quit from the market. Secondly, we investigate how ﬁrms’ turnover affects the
aggregate or macro TFP growth.
5.1 TFP measurement results
First we show the basic results of macro (industry) level TFP in Table 4.17 The numbers are













t stands for value added share for ﬁrm i at term t. According to Olley and Pakes (1996),































 t is an arithmetic mean of ﬁrm’s value added share at time t. The ﬁrst term is non-
weighted mean of ﬁrms’ TFP and the second term is covariance of ﬁrms’ TFP and value-added
share. The value of the second term will be positive (negative) if there is a positive (negative)
correlation between a ﬁrm size and TFP.
Table 4 shows the results of macro (industry) level TFP and its decomposition based on
(2) for ten major industries.18 The value of a covariance term is positive for all industries
throughout the observation period, which implies that the ﬁrm-level economies of scale are
widely observed in major industries that BSJBSA covers. It has been repeatedly conﬁrmed that
there exist economies of scale at establishment level in the Japanese manufacturing industry.19
17The calculation method of TFP including input/output deﬁnitions and data sources is described in Appendix
B.
18We note thatvalue added share
 i
t used at the calculationinTable 4is the ratioofﬁrm i ’s nominalvalue added
to total nominal value added of the “industry” that ﬁrm i belongs to.
19See, for example, Nakajima, Nakamura and Yoshioka (1998).
13Table 4: Industry level TFP and its decomposition
Industry level Non-weighted mean Covariance Industry level Non-weighted mean Covariance
lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP lnTFP
Food products and beverages Transportation machinery
1994 0.639 -0.176 0.815 1994 0.097 -0.072 0.169
1995 0.721 -0.136 0.857 1995 0.236 -0.049 0.285
1996 0.724 -0.134 0.858 1996 0.281 -0.087 0.368
1997 0.753 -0.140 0.892 1997 0.219 -0.123 0.343
1998 0.756 -0.131 0.887 1998 0.101 -0.234 0.335
Textiles Precision machinery
1994 0.037 -0.237 0.275 1994 -0.123 -0.154 0.031
1995 0.167 -0.169 0.336 1995 -0.035 -0.086 0.051
1996 0.079 -0.196 0.275 1996 0.035 -0.073 0.108
1997 0.120 -0.215 0.335 1997 0.110 -0.106 0.215
1998 0.049 -0.277 0.326 1998 0.211 -0.041 0.252
Chemicals Wholesale trade
1994 0.552 0.207 0.345 1994 0.542 0.025 0.517
1995 0.674 0.229 0.445 1995 0.519 0.057 0.462
1996 0.808 0.306 0.501 1996 0.554 0.084 0.470
1997 0.884 0.351 0.533 1997 0.544 0.082 0.462
1998 0.831 0.330 0.501 1998 0.655 0.166 0.490
General machinery Retail trade
1994 0.195 -0.116 0.311 1994 -0.152 -0.273 0.121
1995 0.385 -0.018 0.403 1995 -0.086 -0.245 0.160
1996 0.445 -0.015 0.460 1996 -0.066 -0.236 0.170
1997 0.390 0.005 0.384 1997 -0.091 -0.268 0.177
1998 0.429 -0.065 0.494 1998 -0.073 -0.195 0.122
Electrical machinery Construction
1994 0.273 -0.193 0.466 1994 0.179 0.119 0.060
1995 0.391 -0.055 0.445 1995 0.303 0.054 0.250
1996 0.692 0.058 0.634 1996 0.219 0.093 0.126
1997 0.815 0.173 0.642 1997 0.240 0.057 0.183
1998 0.664 0.166 0.498 1998 0.347 0.050 0.296
Source: N2K Panel Data
14Table 5: Growth rates of non-weighted means of ﬁrm TFP for industries
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.370 0.219 -0.102 0.051
Mining 0.097 0.076 0.086 -0.043
Food products and beverages 0.040 0.005 0.006 0.010
Textiles 0.048 -0.034 -0.036 -0.066
Pulp, paper and paper products 0.024 0.010 0.038 -0.034
Chemicals 0.021 0.062 0.046 -0.030
Petroleum and coal products 0.045 0.071 0.024 -0.090
Non-metallic mineral products 0.064 0.010 0.033 -0.095
Iron, Steel and non-ferrous metals 0.034 0.062 0.009 -0.108
Fabricated metal products 0.056 -0.001 -0.020 -0.038
General machinery 0.088 0.012 0.032 -0.061
Electrical machinery 0.134 0.104 0.101 -0.035
Transportation machinery 0.033 -0.040 -0.027 -0.103
Precision machinery 0.072 0.020 -0.024 0.052
Other manufacturing 0.050 0.041 -0.009 -0.044
Construction -0.074 0.024 -0.021 -0.041
Electricity, gas and water supply -0.002 -0.047 0.201 -0.042
Wholesale trade 0.030 0.016 -0.006 0.082
Retail trade 0.025 0.013 -0.026 0.073
Finance and insurance 0.385 0.264 0.042 0.049
Real estate 0.205 0.017 -0.041 -0.082
Transport and communications -0.024 0.008 0.180 0.114
Service activities 0.024 0.067 -0.019 0.030
Source: N2K panel data
At the ﬁrm level, on the other hand, it seems ambiguous, because we have few empirical studies
on this issue.20 The result in Table 4 is the ﬁrst evidence to show large ﬁrms’ relative efﬁciency.
Table 5 summarizes annual growth rates of non-weighted means of ﬁrm TFP for industries.
Until 1996 positive changes had been widely observed. TFP downturn started from 1996 to
1997 and spread over the entire industry in 1998.
5.2 Cohort analysis of TFP
How does NSM work in the market?
If economic Darwinism is applicable to the market economy, those organizations, which are
efﬁcient in the business environment, will drive others out. In other words, ﬁrms with high
productivity would survive while those with low productivity would exit. As a matter of fact,
20Nakajima, Nakamura, Nakamura and Nakamura (2003)shows economies of scale are notwidely observed for
enterprises listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
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the efﬁciencyof a competitivemarketeconomy is based on NSM. Inthis subsection we examine
whether NSM worked in the Japanese market in the 1990s.
Figure 1 illustrates the classiﬁcation of ﬁrms according to the information about when they
appear in BSJBSA and disappear.21 Greek letters from
  to
  identify the entry years of ﬁrms.
Subscript numbers point to the years when ﬁrms exist in BSJBSA. To illustrate,
 96 means
a group of ﬁrms that appeared in 1995 and at least existed in 1996. Superscripts, S and X,
indicate “surviving” and “exit” ﬁrms in a group of ﬁrms in the year of a subscript number.
Firms of group
  X
97, for example, entered in 1994, at least existed in 1997, and disappeared in
1998.
Table 6 displays (non-weighted) arithmetical means of TFP indices for classiﬁed ﬁrms in
Figure 1. Differences between mean values of surviving and exiting ﬁrms are not signiﬁcant
at least at the 5% level except
 94. Shaded areas just show that the TFP of exiting ﬁrms is
21We have referred to Aw et al. (2001) to draw the ﬁgure.
16Table 6: TFP for entry, surviving, and exit ﬁrms
1998
1.115 1.165 1.199 1.214
1.060 1.119 1.195 1.167
exit exit exit exit
1.139 1.189 1.200 1.212
1.079 1.096 1.095 1.130










Note: Shaded areas indicate a non-weighted mean of TFP of exiting firms is greater than that of surviving firms.
1.178












1.215 Before 1994 cohort (α)
1994 1995 1996
1.110 1.162 1.199 1.211
1997
greater than that of surviving ﬁrms. Although signiﬁcant differences are not observed, we can
collect some noteworthy messages from the table. For the cohort of before-1994, 1994, and
1995 entrants, TFP levels of “active ﬁrms” have been increasing yearly while less productive
ﬁrms exit. This is consistent with the implication derived from the model in Olley and Pakes
(1996) and the empirical results from Tybout (1992), which show the market mechanism was
appropriately working at that time. On the other hand, the TFP cohort of 1996 entrants shows
the opposite directionofchange to 1997, because more productive infant ﬁrms had exited before
1997. For 1997 entrant’s cohort the same tendency is observed. These results may suggest a
malfunction of NSM in Japan since 1996.
Observation on industry level
To assess the effectiveness of NSM at industry levels, we should consider an additional channel
of entry and exit. It is a switchover from one industry to another. Suppose ﬁrm A converts its
main product from X to Y. It will be re-classiﬁed and treated as an exit ﬁrm in X industry and
an entry ﬁrm in Y. Because ﬁrm A is obviously different from a “real” or greenﬁeld entry ﬁrm
in the Y industry, it is desirable to distinguish ﬁrms such as A from others.
17We selected three industries: manufacturing, wholesale & retail, and construction and made
calculations of non-weighted mean TFP indices for entry, surviving, switching, and exiting
ﬁrms as shown in Table 7. Shaded areas indicate TFP indices of switching out and exiting ﬁrms
are higher than those of surviving ﬁrms at a 5% signiﬁcance level. Results in manufacturing
industries are in sharp contrast with those in wholesale & retail industries. In manufacturing
industries, less productiveﬁrmshave exited fromthepool ofactive ﬁrms, while moreproductive
ﬁrms have shifted to other industries (and thus become entry ﬁrms with higher productivity). In
wholesale and retail trade industries surviving ﬁrms have shown lower TFP than exiting ﬁrms
and more productive ﬁrms have shifted from these industries. These ﬁndings suggest NSM is
effectively working in manufacturing industries, but it is not in wholesale and retail industries.
Incontrast, fewsigniﬁcantdifferencesbetween surviving,switching, and exitingﬁrmsare found
in the construction sector.22
5.3 Effect of entry/exit on industry level TFP
If there is neither entry/exit nor switch-in/out, industry level TFP growth rate in the equation
(1) shows a consistent decomposition into the contribution of each ﬁrm’s TFP growth and that




























































The second termofthe above expression is called“re-allocationeffect”because a gainin market
share by a productive ﬁrm makes a positive contribution to macro level TFP.
The decomposition of (4), however, is not applicable to unbalanced panel data containing
ﬁrms of entry/exit and switch-in/out. A more general decomposition formula, including the
22We shouldbe careful to interpret the result of the construction sector, however. As shown before, construction
ﬁrms in BSJBSA are mostly small and medium size enterprises that also engage in manufacturing as their minor
activities.
18Table 7: Non-weighted mean TFP for entry, switching, and exit ﬁrms
Manufacturing switching switching switching switching
surviving 1.173 surviving 1.295 surviving 1.207 surviving 1.364
Before 1994 cohort (α) 1.100 1.169 1.214 1.262
1.001 1.085 1.202 1.166
exit exit exit exit
switching switching switching switching
entry 1.391 surviving 1.177 surviving 1.222 surviving 1.201
1994 cohort (β) 1.052 1.105 1.161 1.205
0.948 1.100 1.092 1.097
exit exit exit exit
switching switching switching
entry 1.218 surviving 1.714 surviving 1.220




entry 1.289 surviving 1.270





1997 cohort (φ) 1.142
1.103
exit
Wholesale and retail trade
1.152 1.220 1.146 1.272
Before 1994 cohort (α) 1.119 1.140 1.160 1.120
1.124 1.166 1.161 1.176
1.035 1.277 1.320 1.196
1994 cohort (β) 1.189 1.264 1.200 1.168
1.160 1.102 1.127 1.154
1.067 1.077 1.097
1995 cohort (γ) 1.158 1.167 1.153
1.111 1.142 1.241
0.937 1.142
1996 cohort (ζ) 1.242 1.126
1.351 1.147
1.242
1997 cohort (φ) 1.158
1.286
Construction
1.416 1.008 1.569 1.064
Before 1994 cohort (α) 1.467 1.494 1.537 1.591
1.515 1.619 1.113 0.556
1.746 1.340 1.033 1.347
1994 cohort (β) 1.586 1.491 1.566 1.677
1.443 1.343 1.014 1.175
1.000 1.059 0.954
1995 cohort (γ) 1.335 1.696 1.740
1.322 1.369 1.099
1.129 0.382
1996 cohort (ζ) 1.523 1.638
1.176 1.449
0.629
1997 cohort (φ) 1.380
0.991
Note: Shaded areas indicate TFP indices of switchinging and exiting firms are higher than those of surviving firms at 5% significant level.
1997 1994 1995 1996























































































































where the superscripts E, X, I, and O symbolize entry, exit, switch-in, and switch-out ﬁrms
respectively.23 The ﬁrst term stands for the effect of the TFP difference between entry and
exit ﬁrms that becomes positive (negative) when TFP for entry ﬁrms is higher (lower) than exit
ﬁrms. The same effect in the case of switch-in and out ﬁrms is shown in the second term.
The third term is the contribution of surviving ﬁrms’ TFP growth. The forth, ﬁfth, and sixth
terms mean “re-allocation effects” through entry/exit and switch-in/out channels and changes
in market shares for surviving ﬁrms respectively.
The decomposition results for major industries are shown in Table 8. For most industries
especially major manufacturing sectors, continuing ﬁrms’ performances are quite inﬂuential to
industry level TFP growth. At this point our results are consistent with the results of preceding
studies like Griliches and Regev (1995) and Haltiwanger (1997). The effect of switch-in/out
is an indicator to investigate whether relatively productive ﬁrms come from or go out to other
sectors. Looking at thenumbersin thethirdcolumn, there is noindustrywith constantlypositive
or negative effects. The effect of market share reallocation in the forth column is positive when
resources are shifted from less productive to more productive ﬁrms. The numbers, however, are







t are value added share weighted means ofTFP
for entry, exit, switch-in, and switch-out ﬁrms between t and t
￿ 1 respectively.
20Table 8: Decomposition of macro level TFP growth rate
Food products and beverages
1994-95 -0.036 0.084 0.028 -0.196 0.048
1995-96 -0.067 0.008 0.018 -0.126 0.033
1996-97 0.117 0.050 -0.038 0.138 -0.033
1997-98 0.041 -0.008 -0.026 0.071 0.004
Textiles
1994-95 0.125 0.102 0.040 -0.016 -0.001
1995-96 -0.085 -0.062 -0.007 0.008 -0.025
1996-97 0.094 -0.003 0.040 0.096 -0.039
1997-98 0.014 -0.020 -0.153 0.197 -0.010
Chemicals
1994-95 -0.008 0.121 0.019 -0.186 0.037
1995-96 0.209 0.128 -0.007 0.095 -0.007
1996-97 0.056 0.050 0.091 -0.026 -0.058
1997-98 -0.073 -0.069 -0.006 -0.012 0.014
General machinery
1994-95 0.194 0.197 -0.057 0.022 0.032
1995-96 0.044 0.053 0.008 -0.032 0.015
1996-97 0.057 -0.058 -0.017 0.167 -0.035
1997-98 -0.045 -0.037 0.118 -0.111 -0.015
Electrical machinery
1994-95 0.072 0.108 0.013 -0.075 0.026
1995-96 0.280 0.295 0.009 -0.013 -0.011
1996-97 0.219 0.094 -0.015 0.157 -0.017
1997-98 -0.148 -0.115 -0.058 0.012 0.013
Transportation machinery
1994-95 0.118 0.142 -0.002 -0.027 0.004
1995-96 0.079 0.026 -0.001 0.059 -0.005
1996-97 -0.066 -0.053 0.004 -0.011 -0.006
1997-98 -0.133 -0.133 0.003 -0.011 0.008
Precision machinery
1994-95 0.151 0.021 -0.038 0.120 0.048
1995-96 0.070 0.013 0.051 -0.002 0.008
1996-97 0.043 0.025 0.126 -0.060 -0.048
1997-98 0.039 0.041 -0.042 -0.098 0.138
Wholesale trade
1994-95 -0.042 -0.026 -0.006 -0.042 0.031
1995-96 0.036 0.028 -0.001 -0.025 0.035
1996-97 -0.012 -0.012 0.015 -0.003 -0.011
1997-98 0.102 0.124 -0.004 -0.014 -0.003
Retail trade
1994-95 0.003 0.061 0.020 -0.124 0.046
1995-96 0.038 0.019 0.001 0.028 -0.010
1996-97 0.010 -0.007 -0.027 0.080 -0.035
1997-98 0.028 0.024 -0.003 0.014 -0.007
Construction
1994-95 -0.004 -0.105 0.307 -0.203 -0.002
1995-96 -0.028 -0.133 0.048 0.098 -0.041
1996-97 0.183 -0.060 -0.015 0.346 -0.088
1997-98 0.030 -0.026 0.207 -0.133 -0.019
Source: N2K Panel Data





21wholesale trade sectors, which illustrates that resource misallocation among existing ﬁrms has
been occurring intheJapanese market. Finally,theentry/exiteffecthas negativevaluesformany
cases. Textile and construction industries especially show constantly negative contributions to
industry level TFP growth. For other industries, values from 1996 to 97 are negative. This
ﬁnding, consistent with the results in Table 6 and 7, indicates there were wide occurrences of
market malfunction at that time.
As was discussed in Section 2, precedingstudies have shown diversiﬁedresults on entry/exit
contribution according to the target economies. In the case of Japan, continuing ﬁrms’ TFP has
been inﬂuential to industry level TFP and this is similar to the U.S. manufacturing industry.
What should be emphasized here, however, is that a ﬁrm’s turnover effect was negative and
an efﬁcient resource allocation system through a ﬁrm’s entry/exit channels seems to have been
functioning poorly in terms of TFP growth.
5.4 Discussion
Well-functioning ﬁnancial markets are important in easing ﬁrms’ entry, survival, and exit be-
havior. While banks and venture capital help entrepreneurs to get started, declining stock prices
and withdrawal of bank loans force ﬁrms to leave their competitive market. Among the several
avenues for a ﬁrm to raise funds, loans from banks still have nearly a 40% share of total funds
for commercial ﬁrms in Japan, although its relative dominance has been decreasing steadily.24
Thus, some evidences of market malfunctioning as shown in the previous section can be inter-
preted in connection with serious non-performing loan problems within the Japanese banking
system.
As in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), credit rationing itself could occur because of asymmetric
information between lenders and borrowers even if ﬁnancial markets are functioning properly.
The real problem is whether funds go to productive ﬁrms. Cabinet Ofﬁce (2001) pointed out
that serious credit shrinking occurred in 1996 as a result of the unwillingness of banks to loan
the available decreasing capital which had been badly damaged by decreasing stock prices since
the burst of bubble. Even with low interest rates, investment in small and medium sized ﬁrms
fell in 1997 and 1998. There is additional suggestive evidence provided in Figure 2-2-6 of
24See Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) for more details about the structural change in the Japanese ﬁnancial markets
since 1980s.
22Cabinet Ofﬁce (2001) which shows that TFP of sectors with the larger share of banking loans
has been lower than the national level of TFP since 1985, and the gap between the two expanded
in 1996.25 This observation coincides exactly with our results.
These ﬁndings also have theoretical backgrounds. Kobayashi, Saita and Sekine (2002)
presents a model to explain that “forbearance of lending” to unproductive ﬁrms would occur
as a result of a bank’s rational proﬁt maximization behavior when additional lending leads to
fewer losses than withdrawal of loans. They estimated a non-linear loan supply function and
showed that increases in a ﬁrm’s debt over a certain level induced more loan supply from banks
in the last half of 1990s. Fukao, Nishimura, Sui and Tomiyama (2003) model two alternatives
that banks face at their proﬁt maximization. One is screening of lending opportunities, and an-
other is improving borrower ﬁrms’ performances. They show that screening activity has been
more dominant in the Japanese banking system than previously and point out that the economic
downturn in the 1990s badly damaged banks. Many banks lost good lending opportunities af-
ter the burst of bubble and, in many cases, they have also been unable to raise borrower ﬁrms’
proﬁtability. These models indicate the possibility that banks’ “rational” behavior, under certain
situations, could make productive ﬁrms leave and unproductive ﬁrms stay.
6 Conclusion
It has been widely accepted that the natural selection mechanism (NSM) of economic Darwin-
ism in competitive markets plays a key role in efﬁcient resource allocation and evolution for
long-term economic growth. Recent development of ﬁrm models provides theoretical back-
ground to the NSM in terms of productivity growth, showing that ﬁrms’ rational decisions on
entry, surviving, and exit leads to macroeconomic TFP growth.
We have attempted to examine whether NSM works properly in the most stressful circum-
stances, e.g., severe recessions. Preceding empirical studies on this issue have examined the
working of NSM only in normal times and have shown evidence to support proper functioning
of NSM with positive contributionof a ﬁrm’s turnoverto macro level TFP growth. However, the
real “test” of NSM is admittedly not normal times but rather times of crisis. We have focused
on the 1990s in the Japanese economy as our period of investigation, with special focus on the
25Refer to http://www5.cao.go.jp/j-j/wp/wp-je01/wp-je01-2-2-06z.html.
231996-1997 period of banking crisis.
In contrast with preceding works, we have found that efﬁcient ﬁrms in terms of TFP quit
while inefﬁcient ones survived, which suggests a malfunctioning of NSM between 1996 and
1997. Besides, this phenomenon is mainly observed for new entrants and contributes substan-
tially to a fall in macro TFP growth after 1996. The result clearly shows that NSM is not
working properly.
One feasible explanation for these results might be the poor functioning of the Japanese
banking system. In Japan, where an indirect ﬁnancial system through banking is still dominant,
banks are widely involved in the resource allocation process such as establishment, liquidation,
and reconstruction of enterprises. The banking system, suffering from non-performing loan
problems after the burst of the bubble economy, might be unable to allocate funds to produc-
tive enterprises and eventually these ﬁrms leave their competitive market. This suggests that
models of ﬁrm dynamics should involve ﬁnancial aspects, at least in recession times, in order
to reasonably explain the movement of the real economy.
Although this paper has presented new fact-ﬁndings on the working of NSM, there still
remain several issues that are beyond the scope of this paper. More thorough analysis of the re-
lationship between NSM and ﬁnancial sectors is needed to examine the role of ﬁnancial sectors
in ﬁrm dynamics. In addition, we have not discussed time-series ﬂuctuations of TFP and its
implications on NSM. We have neither examined how inter-ﬁrm differentiation of TFP occurs
nor how TFP affects a ﬁrm’s organizational dynamics. These issues will be explored in the next
stage of our research.
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Appendix
A Supplementary explanation to N2K Panel
As is described in the text, samples in BSJBSA are censored at certain points of employment
size (50 employees) and capitalization size (30 million yen). Therefore, if a ﬁrm decreases the
number of employees or capital and goes out of the range of investigation, it disappears from
BSJBSA, but actually still exists in the market. It reappears when its employment and capital
size criteria are satisﬁed.
Table A1 summarizesentry/exitpatternsofBSJBSA ﬁrmsthatsatisfy theconsistency criteria
in the previous subsection. The shadowed area (from group 22 to 63) corresponds to a ﬁrm’s
re-entry behavior patterns. More than 10 % of the all ﬁrms take re-entry action every year.
The following three reasons might be considered to explain these considerably large numbers.
Firstly, a ﬁrm might give wrong answers or no response to questionnaires. Secondly, a ﬁrm’s
employment or capital size would ﬂuctuate around the censoring points of BSJBSA. The table,
however, might not support this possibility, because the mean values of employment and capital
sizes for re-entry ﬁrms are far more than censoring points. Thirdly, a ﬁrm might repeatedly
experience a merger or a separation. Because BSJBSA provides no information to identify
speciﬁc cases for each ﬁrm, we have to simply treat re-entry ﬁrms as new entrants.
Table A2 and A3 show the basic statistics for the original BSJBSA and for the N2K panel
respectively. There are no big differences between the two values before and after for value
27Table A1: Entry/exit patterns
The number of firms Employment size (the mean value) Capital size (the mean value, million yen)
group year 1991 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1991 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1991 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1 1991 2,423 210 381
2 1991-1994 946 946 205 193 406 403
3 1991-1994-1995 723 723 723 230 237 226 513 528 541
4 1991-1994-1995-1996 873 873 873 873 289 276 269 263 650 705 727 737
5 1991-1994-1995-1996-1997 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,079 265 258 248 245 251 521 615 619 644 705
6 1991-1994-1995-1996-1997-1998 14,610 14,610 14,610 14,610 14,610 14,610 494 493 487 483 483 477 1,581 1,638 1,679 1,727 1,756 1,795
7 1994 610 190 211
8 1994-1995 318 318 194 201 632 640
9 1994-1995-1996 318 318 318 167 169 166 318 311 351
10 1994-1995-1996-1997 321 321 321 321 193 192 196 189 511 518 548 579
11 1994-1995-1996-1997-1998 2,607 2,607 2,607 2,607 2,607 277 277 280 284 280 687 698 729 750 765
12 1995 395 140 238
13 1995-1996 257 257 177 176 280 284
14 1995-1996-1997 242 242 242 156 157 163 319 325 352
15 1995-1996-1997-1998 1,702 1,702 1,702 1,702 204 208 213 213 407 425 434 441
16 1996 259 178 226
17 1996-1997 172 172 306 303 239 259
18 1996-1997-1998 856 856 856 185 194 192 356 343 342
19 1997 326 320 304
20 1997-1998 1,294 1,294 355 348 332 355
21 1998 1,245 194 254
22 1991-1994-1995-1996-1998 405 405 405 405 405 346 349 346 348 344 745 798 805 819 872
23 1991-1994-1995-1997 102 102 102 102 245 226 222 216 343 300 313 385
24 1991-1994-1995-1997-1998 295 295 295 295 295 267 296 301 295 302 464 493 506 538 595
25 1991-1994-1995-1998 131 131 131 131 391 384 377 368 1,360 1,363 1,367 1,397
26 1991-1994-1996 82 82 82 226 222 214 240 259 253
27 1991-1994-1996-1997 53 53 53 53 178 175 183 187 661 715 712 710
28 1991-1994-1996-1997-1998 341 341 341 341 341 286 280 296 292 302 737 786 833 861 887
29 1991-1994-1996-1998 38 38 38 38 273 250 247 240 277 320 362 409
30 1991-1994-1997 31 31 31 230 213 212 101 102 109
31 1991-1994-1997-1998 114 114 114 114 226 220 243 235 247 259 283 286
32 1991-1994-1998 80 80 80 285 312 300 460 453 518
33 1991-1995 106 106 200 178 151 164
34 1991-1995-1996 82 82 82 383 399 400 470 611 650
35 1991-1995-1996-1997 77 77 77 77 238 265 268 259 227 259 259 301
36 1991-1995-1996-1997-1998 530 530 530 530 530 356 386 390 379 382 1,333 1,933 1,503 1,540 1,630
37 1991-1995-1996-1998 36 36 36 36 203 254 231 227 692 924 1,206 1,392
38 1991-1995-1997 21 21 21 318 317 312 731 776 786
39 1991-1995-1997-1998 33 33 33 33 233 207 230 229 420 429 439 440
40 1991-1995-1998 30 30 30 163 181 225 89 116 135
41 1991-1996 68 68 173 184 184 261
42 1991-1996-1997 39 39 39 159 165 161 198 219 221
43 1991-1996-1997-1998 162 162 162 162 323 320 323 321 647 760 774 798
44 1991-1996-1998 25 25 25 292 386 483 598 946 959
45 1991-1997 47 47 202 200 162 173
46 1991-1997-1998 161 161 161 169 169 166 193 233 243
47 1991-1998 127 127 240 219 248 284
48 1994-1995-1996-1998 115 115 115 115 304 319 341 328 518 552 554 584
49 1994-1995-1997 40 40 40 189 201 192 275 280 295
50 1994-1995-1997-1998 109 109 109 109 342 339 315 411 178 193 200 210
51 1994-1995-1998 48 48 48 215 220 205 147 146 168
52 1994-1996 35 35 166 141 438 124
53 1994-1996-1997 31 31 31 153 144 141 2,253 2,277 2,277
54 1994-1996-1997-1998 143 143 143 143 209 225 224 218 315 332 335 343
55 1994-1996-1998 24 24 24 242 219 235 148 159 182
56 1994-1997 25 25 117 158 113 120
57 1994-1997-1998 66 66 66 213 199 201 137 154 158
58 1994-1998 58 58 175 176 353 377
59 1995-1996-1998 125 125 125 167 172 174 253 258 262
60 1995-1997 33 33 180 167 118 120
61 1995-1997-1998 100 100 100 173 212 224 198 224 232
62 1995-1998 68 68 173 168 353 513
63 1996-1998 95 95 186 198 328 353
1991 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
The number of non re-entry firms 20,654 22,405 23,445 23,296 23,209 22,314
The number of re-entry firms 3,216 2,366 2,486 2,506 2,553 3,459
The number of total firms 23,870 24,771 25,931 25,802 25,762 25,773
28added, tangible ﬁxed asset, investment, labor compensation, the number of regular workers,
working hours, and depreciation rate.26
B Calculation method of TFP
In this appendix we present a methodology for TFP measurement and variables deﬁnitions for
the calculation.
B.1 Methodology
For the both cross-section and time-series comparability of TFP, we applied the methodology
utilized in Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982), Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1983),
and Good, Nadiri, Roeller and Sickles (1983). To avoid complex arithmetical expressions we
simply describe the calculation procedure.
1. Deﬁne a hypothetical (representative) ﬁrm for each year. Its input and output are cal-
culated as geometric means of those of all ﬁrms, and its input cost shares as arithmetic
means.
2. Calculate TFP index based on the Theil=T¨ ornqvist speciﬁcation for each ﬁrm, for each
year, relative to a hypothetical ﬁrm calculated in the ﬁrst step.
3. Make time series of TFP index for a hypothetical ﬁrm for each year.
4. Adjust TFP index for each form of the second step according to a hypothetical ﬁrm’s TFP
index calculated in the previous step.
In the second step, time series (absolute) comparison is impossible because a ﬁrm’s TFP index
has a relative value to a hypothetical ﬁrm for each year. A time series linkage of a TFP index
for a hypothetical ﬁrm in the third step makes it possible to compare a ﬁrm’s TFP both cross-
sectionally and in time series.27
26Careful readers may ﬁnd the difference in the number of ﬁrms between Table A1 and A3. The difference
reﬂects whether the new deﬁnition of entry/exit in the previous subsection is applied or not. In Table A4 a re-entry
ﬁrm is treated as a new entrant. Firms that do not satisfy the consistency conditions, at least for a single year,
are entirely excluded from the data set in Table A1 but would be included in Table A3 as a new (re-entry) ﬁrm
satisfying the consistency conditions.
27To illustrate, suppose the TFP index of a hypothetical ﬁrm is 1.0 for a benchmark year (T) and 1.2 for the next
year (T
￿ 1). The TFP index numbers at T
￿ 1 for all samples calculated in the second step are adjusted to be











1991 value added 24,345 12,904 102,933 -36,187 672 2,454 16,093 8,940,898
tangible asset 24,345 4,311 27,489 0 137 846 5,854 1,481,413
investment 24,345 1,091 7,805 0 0 82 1,446 419,300
labor compensation 24,345 1,911 10,264 0 238 580 2,913 578,086
regular worker 24,345 398 1,649 50 65 146 659 82,221
working hours 24,351 2,001 108 1,796 1,890 2,000 2,155 2,208
depreciation rate 24,280 0.16 4.43 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.23 649.00
1994 value added 25,237 7,037 46,094 -18,974 542 1,642 9,636 2,615,367
tangible asset 25,237 4,593 29,855 0 130 885 6,300 1,327,445
investment 25,237 583 4,644 -9,332 0 45 770 230,000
labor compensation 25,237 1,966 10,358 0 238 596 3,085 560,300
regular worker 25,237 392 1,605 50 64 143 662 77,185
working hours 25,242 2,005 45 1,822 1,962 1,996 2,066 2,208
depreciation rate 25,207 0.27 5.84 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.21 589.00
1995 value added 26,424 7,123 44,703 -1,068 555 1,621 9,575 2,331,719
tangible asset 26,424 4,537 29,229 0 130 873 6,221 1,304,089
investment 26,424 744 7,317 0 0 46 866 603,384
labor compensation 26,424 2,064 10,655 2 262 631 3,278 574,947
regular worker 26,424 381 1,535 50 63 139 653 76,106
working hours 26,429 2,005 46 1,825 1,967 1,985 2,066 2,173
depreciation rate 26,388 0.14 2.13 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.21 323.75
1996 value added 26,310 7,712 53,397 -55,958 575 1,674 9,791 3,114,603
tangible asset 26,310 4,609 28,758 0 129 893 6,377 1,326,891
investment 26,310 775 6,060 0 0 52 943 439,573
labor compensation 26,310 2,130 11,097 5 273 652 3,382 654,735
regular worker 26,310 380 1,520 50 64 141 648 72,837
working hours 26,315 2,030 49 1,825 1,984 2,015 2,092 2,192
depreciation rate 26,263 0.12 0.26 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.21 22.05
1997 value added 26,277 7,524 50,046 -25,551 570 1,663 9,598 2,285,374
tangible asset 26,277 4,706 30,033 0 130 918 6,458 1,366,758
investment 26,277 798 6,330 0 0 52 965 397,028
labor compensation 26,277 2,071 11,106 11 265 632 3,224 653,401
regular worker 26,277 388 1,613 50 63 140 649 75,510
working hours 26,282 2,015 54 1,818 1,985 1,987 2,093 2,152
depreciation rate 26,210 0.12 0.85 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.21 83.60
1998 value added 26,270 6,934 44,422 -17,831 543 1,571 9,131 2,417,829
tangible asset 26,270 4,745 30,034 0 131 930 6,577 1,424,669
investment 26,270 743 6,228 0 0 41 861 329,523
labor compensation 26,270 2,024 10,788 9 262 621 3,175 674,022
regular worker 26,270 385 1,585 50 62 138 645 71,237
working hours 26,276 1,866 112 1,745 1,745 1,902 2,011 2,096
depreciation rate 26,219 0.13 1.05 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.22 128.18











1991 value added 23,914 13,074 103,816 1 696 2,489 16,220 8,940,898
tangible asset 23,914 4,351 27,716 1 142 852 5,886 1,481,413
investment 23,914 1,102 7,871 0 0 84 1,458 419,300
labor compensation 23,914 1,924 10,351 0 238 580 2,927 578,086
regular worker 23,914 400 1,662 50 65 146 662 82,221
working hours 23,914 2,001 108 1,796 1,890 2,000 2,155 2,208
depreciation rate 23,914 0.17 4.46 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.23 649.00
1994 value added 24,793 7,085 46,454 4 544 1,648 9,685 2,615,367
tangible asset 24,793 4,627 30,091 1 135 892 6,330 1,327,445
investment 24,793 582 4,653 -9,332 0 45 775 230,000
labor compensation 24,793 1,976 10,441 2 238 597 3,099 560,300
regular worker 24,793 393 1,615 50 64 143 663 77,185
working hours 24,793 2,005 45 1,822 1,962 1,996 2,066 2,208
depreciation rate 24,793 0.27 5.89 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.20 589.00
1995 value added 25,947 7,169 45,049 2 558 1,628 9,601 2,331,719
tangible asset 25,947 4,570 29,465 1 134 877 6,264 1,304,089
investment 25,947 748 7,370 0 0 46 867 603,384
labor compensation 25,947 2,073 10,743 2 261 631 3,276 574,947
regular worker 25,947 382 1,546 50 63 139 653 76,106
working hours 25,947 2,005 46 1,825 1,967 1,985 2,066 2,173
depreciation rate 25,947 0.14 2.15 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.21 323.75
1996 value added 25,818 7,773 53,842 8 578 1,680 9,860 3,114,603
tangible asset 25,818 4,644 28,998 1 135 898 6,404 1,326,891
investment 25,818 781 6,108 0 0 52 945 439,573
labor compensation 25,818 2,137 11,181 5 273 652 3,384 654,735
regular worker 25,818 381 1,531 50 64 141 648 72,837
working hours 25,818 2,030 49 1,825 1,984 2,015 2,092 2,192
depreciation rate 25,818 0.12 0.26 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.21 22.05
1997 value added 25,781 7,599 50,509 2 575 1,667 9,653 2,285,374
tangible asset 25,781 4,747 30,296 1 137 923 6,490 1,366,758
investment 25,781 801 6,370 0 0 52 966 397,028
labor compensation 25,781 2,082 11,203 11 265 633 3,232 653,401
regular worker 25,781 389 1,625 50 63 141 650 75,510
working hours 25,781 2,015 54 1,818 1,985 1,987 2,093 2,152
depreciation rate 25,781 0.12 0.86 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.21 83.60
1998 value added 25,805 6,992 44,801 3 545 1,574 9,142 2,417,829
tangible asset 25,805 4,781 30,279 1 136 934 6,584 1,424,669
investment 25,805 748 6,277 0 0 42 860 329,523
labor compensation 25,805 2,033 10,876 9 262 621 3,183 674,022
regular worker 25,805 385 1,596 50 62 138 645 71,237
working hours 25,805 1,867 112 1,745 1,745 1,902 2,011 2,096
depreciation rate 25,805 0.13 1.05 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.22 128.18
31B.2 Variable deﬁnitions for TFP calculation
Output
To describe production technology in general, output is deﬁned in terms of gross value while
materials are included in input factors. On the other hand, value added, subtracting the latter
from the former, is less preferable because it may cause a systematic bias in TFP indicators.28
In this paper, however, we use value added instead of gross value for output because of the
restriction in data availability of BSJBSA.I nBSJBSA, the only available information concerning
material input is “amount of goods purchased,” where no breakdown is given. This limitation is
very crucial to the calculation of material input price index. Value added deﬂators are available
in System of National Accounts by Cabinet Ofﬁce of Japan.
Input
We deﬁne input factors as labor and capital to keep consistency with our output deﬁnition.
Labor input is simply calculated by multiplying the number of regular workers by annual per
capita working hours.29 Making time-series of capital stock from BSJBSA, on the other hand, is
really a tricky job. Because BSJBSA has considerable numbers of samples with null investment,
a well-known perpetual inventory method is not applicable. Instead the following steps are
taken to make capital stock series. First we deﬁne the book value of a tangible ﬁxed asset in
1994 (a bench mark year) as a real capital stock of 1994.30 Capital stock for the next term is

































￿ Kt stands for real capital stock at t, Kt for book values of tangible ﬁxed assets, and qt
for a investment goods deﬂator.31 This formula means that positive increments of book values
are assumed as net investments and added to real capital stock of the previous term through
multiplied by 1.2.
28See McGuckin and Nguyen (1993) for more details about this issue.
29The statistics of working hours are available in Monthly Labor Survey by Ministry of Health, Labor, and
Welfare.
30This may cause an underestimate of capital stock for older ﬁrms.
31The statistics of investment goods deﬂators is available in System of National Accounts by Cabinet Ofﬁce of
Japan.
32the deﬂation process. If book values are decreasing, on the other hand, we simply subtract the
amount of reduction from real capital stock of the previous term.32 Interest rates (10-year-bond
yield) and depreciation rates for user cost of capital are from Bank of Japan and KEO Data Base





















  is the corporate tax rate on business income34 and z denotes the present value of the
depreciation deduction on unit nominal investment.35
Table A5: Labor and capital cost shares
Summary statistics
Labor share
N Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
1994 24793 0.744837 0.164026 0.006031 0.999935
1995 25947 0.779443 0.147063 0.008931 0.999944
1996 25818 0.785927 0.143513 0.004469 0.999952
1997 25781 0.808969 0.133764 0.017319 0.999946
1998 25805 0.796084 0.139587 0.014316 0.999939
Capital share
N Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
1994 24793 0.255163 0.164026 0.000065 0.993970
1995 25947 0.220558 0.147063 0.000056 0.991069
1996 25818 0.214073 0.143513 0.000048 0.995531
1997 25781 0.191031 0.133764 0.000055 0.982681
1998 25805 0.203916 0.139587 0.000061 0.985684
Source: N2K Panel Data
Table A5 shows labor and capital cost shares based on the deﬁnitions above. Relatively high
32A decrease in book values appears in the case of greater depreciation and/or disposal of stock than gross
investment. Because of thelack ofinformationoncapital stockvintage itis quite difﬁculttoapplyotherprocedures
than the one described in the text.
33Although capital cost and depreciation rates are certainly different, company by company, according to its
managerial condition and production technology, the limitation of data availability forces us to assume that capital
cost is common to all ﬁrms and a depreciation rate is differentiated only between industries. Financial data,
materials, and papers published in the Bank of Japan are now available at Tokiwa Sogo Service Ltd. KEO Data
Base (KDB) has been developed at Keio Economic Observatory. We thank Koji Nomura for the provision of
information about KDB.
34The tax rate are quoted from Cabinet Ofﬁce (2001).





















 05. The second equation means that the end point of depreciation period is
deﬁned the time when the accumulated depreciation cost approximately equals to 90% of initial investment.
33labor cost shares may reﬂect BSJBSA’s wide coverage of small and medium enterprises.36
36To test this possibility, we have estimated Tobit model that has a capital cost share as a dependent variable and
sales, ﬁrm age, industry dummy variable, and year as independent variables. As a result the coefﬁcient of sales
was positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
34